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Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law
Thirty Years of Environmental Protection
Law in the Supreme Court
RICHARD J. LAZARUS*
It is an honor to present a lecture named after Lloyd Garrison
and to be here at Pace Law School. It is especially fitting, of
course, that the first Garrison Lecture was presented by Pace's
own David Sive. Professor Sive, as we all know, worked closely
with Garrison on the celebrated Scenic Hudson litigation.1 Few
legal counsel have been so closely identified with the emergence of
the environmental law profession during the past three decades.
Indeed, if there were such a thing as a legal thesaurus that linked
substantive areas of law with lawyers and one looked up "environ-
Copyright © 1999 Pace University School of Law; Richard J. Lazarus
* John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
This article and the underlying factual information was first presented at Pace Law
School on March 11, 1999, as the Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environ-
mental Law, but has been updated in light of a few events occurring subsequent to
that presentation. Because this lecture does not lend itself to a full presentation of
the statistical compilation of United States Supreme Court rulings underlying the
lecture or to a complete elaboration of the related analysis, that fuller version is being
separately published. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 703 (2000).
Special thanks are owed to Staci Krupp, J.D. Candidate 2000, Georgetown University
Law Center, and Alex Steffan, J.D. 1999, Georgetown University Law Center, who
provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of the initial lecture and
this article. This article discusses Supreme Court decisions in many cases, including
some in which I served as counsel for parties involved in the litigation. The views
expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of those
parties I represented.
1. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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mental law," its first synonym would undoubtedly be "David
Sive."2
I do not and could not, however, make claim to the extraordi-
nary pedigree of David Sive: One of the first of the very first gen-
eration of modern environmental lawyers in this country. Nor can
a fair comparison be made to the other three Garrison Lecturers
who preceded me: Professors Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, and Oliver
Houck. These are true pioneers. They inspired much in the for-
mation of modern environmental protection law, and have served
since in their scholarship and their legal counsel as the law's
guardians and promoters.
But what I strive to claim is a close lineage, as the first of the
second generation of environmental lawyers and scholars to de-
liver this lecture. I use the term "lineage" deliberately. For al-
though I did not then know any of them by name, it was the work
of Lloyd Garrison, David Sive, and the others that resulted in my
own decision to engage in the study and practice of environmental
law.
I made my decision to become an environmental lawyer dur-
ing my freshman year in college in 1971, because of the events
then occurring in our nation. Like many of my contemporaries in
environmental law, I saw as my role models those environmental
law activists who seemed to be shaping the nation's future in nec-
essary and positive ways. So it should be no surprise that I feel a
great debt to those who preceded me as Garrison lecturers, and to
Lloyd Garrison, whom I never had the pleasure to meet.
As much as I deliberately, if not obsessively, struck a path of
becoming an environmental lawyer and law professor twenty-
eight years ago, the actual direction of that path has necessarily
been the result of much happenstance and fortuity. One bit of
good fortune has been my consistent involvement with the U.S.
Supreme Court, both as a practicing lawyer and a legal academic. 3
This lecture stems from that work by examining the Supreme
Court's role in environmental law's evolution during the past
2. Professor Sive is often referred to as the "father of environmental law." See
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Profiles in Power 100-The Most Influential Lawyers in
America, NAT'L L.J., March 25, 1991, at S2.
3. I joined the Department of Justice in the fall of 1979, after law school gradua-
tion. The Court soon after granted review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), for which I was assigned responsibility for drafting the position of the United
States as amicus curiae. Since then, I have had the opportunity to represent the fed-
eral government, state and local governments, and environmental groups in a host of
cases before the Supreme Court.
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thirty years, as reflected in the Court's decisions and the votes of
the individual Justices. My view is that those decisions and votes
increasingly suggest a lack of appreciation of environmental law
as a distinct area of law.
This lecture's objectives are three-fold. The first is perhaps
somewhat pedantic, but both revealing and even entertaining for
those (like me) who are preoccupied with the Court. It is to high-
light some facts and figures about the past thirty years of environ-
mental and natural resources law cases before the Court that tell
much about the Court and the individual Justices.
The second objective is to suggest what the Court's decisions
tell us about the nature and practice of environmental law. This
includes how environmental law relates to other areas of law with
which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects. It also includes les-
sons regarding how, accordingly, law students who seek to become
environmental lawyers should approach the study of law. It like-
wise extends to how environmental lawyers seeking to promote
environmental protection and resource conservation can be the
most effective in litigation.
The third and final objective is more modest. It is to describe
a potentially significant case that the Court heard during the Oc-
tober 1999 Term. The case was important because at stake was
the future role of citizen suit enforcement in environmental law,
which has long been one of environmental law's essential
hallmarks.4 More broadly, however, the case proved significant
because it provided the Court with a much needed opportunity to
reverse the disturbing trend discernible in its precedent and to
restore what is "environmental" about environmental law.
I. A Scorecard Of The Justices' Votes In Environmental
Cases
Commencing with the Supreme Court's October Term 1969,
the Court has decided over 240 environmental and natural re-
sources law cases on the merits.5 There are a host of intriguing
4. See CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER
EPA ADMINISTERED STATUTES (Environmental Law Institute 1984).
5. A listing of the cases is included in an appendix to this article. Whether a case
is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes of this threshold inquiry turns
on whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are at stake. The
legal issue before the Court need not independently have an environmental character
to it. The stakes themselves are sufficient to invoke the label. The Garrison Lecture
upon which this article is based was delivered on March 11, 1999. Since then, the
Supreme Court has decided two additional environmental cases, City of Monterey v.
3
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factual inquiries that could be undertaken concerning these rul-
ings. This lecture, however, focuses on only three: (1) which Jus-
tices wrote the most decisions for the Court during the past thirty
years; (2) which Justices have been in the majority the most fre-
quently; and (3) which Justices have tended to vote for outcomes
that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather
than more).
A. Justice White: The Justice Who Wrote the Most
Environmental Decisions For the Court
In tallying which Justice has written the most environmental
opinions for the Court during the past thirty years, one might
fairly anticipate that the opinions would be split roughly evenly
with Chief Justice Rehnquist leading the pack. After all, the
Chief Justice has served longer on the Court than anyone pres-
ently there and his tenure virtually spans the relevant time pe-
riod, with his joining the Court as a Justice in 1971. But it is in
fact neither the Chief Justice leading the pack nor is it even a
close question as to who has written the most environmental opin-
ions for the Court. Nineteen Justices have served on the Court
during the relevant time period 6 and Justice White, who left the
Court in 1993, is the leading opinion writer for the Court by a
large margin.
Justice White wrote thirty-six opinions. The next closest is
Justice O'Connor with twenty-two opinions for the Court. How is
that revealing? What philosophy does one think about Justice
White and environmental protection? The fairest answer is none
at all.
Justice White harbored no particular interest in environmen-
tal law. His opinions are dispassionate, dry, and formalistic, with
little effort to elaborate any particular philosophical vision. In
this respect, moreover, his environmental law opinions do not dif-
fer from his opinions for the Court generally, which a recent biog-
Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999), and Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999), which have been added to the database and, when rele-
vant, to the discussion in the text of this article.
6. These Justices are: Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, and there have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist.
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raphy describes as evidencing little "elaboration of philosophical
vision"7 and "never aspiring beyond plain, workmanlike prose."8
Justice White's controlling philosophy (or lack thereof) is ex-
emplified by his votes in three cases during the 1986 October
Term. The Supreme Court during that term handed down the so-
called "Takings Trilogy," three cases raising Fifth Amendment
regulatory takings challenges to environmental restrictions: Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,9 First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,10
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.1 The juxtaposition
of these three cases presented a true jurisprudential paradox and
certainly no readily discernible, coherent view of the Takings
Clause.12
Nor do White's opinions for the Court otherwise suggest any
distinct vision of the role of law in environmental protection. The
Official Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall provide another
clear example. In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,13 Justice White wrote for the Court's
slim five-Justice majority an opinion that upheld the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of
the Clean Water Act. As disclosed by the Marshall Papers, how-
ever, he did so only after concluding that there is "little or no dif-
ference in principle" between the opposing arguments and that
"administrative law will not be measurably advanced or set back
however this case is decided.' 4 White did not see the case, which-
ever way it was decided, as being of significant import. The case
presented only a narrow, fact-bound issue regarding the suffi-
ciency of an administrative record.
7. DENNIS HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WIZZER WHITE 451 (1998)
(quoting Kate Stith, Byron White: Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19 n.1
(1993)).
8. Id. at 454.
9. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
10. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625 (1988).
13. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
14. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to The Chief Justice, Re: 83- 1013-Chem-
ical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC (November 13, 1984) (Official Papers of the Cham-
bers of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
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B. Justice Kennedy: The Justice Most Often in the Majority in
Environmental Cases
Another revealing factual inquiry concerns the frequency
with which individual Justices were in the majority in environ-
mental cases during the past thirty years. Not surprisingly, Jus-
tice White's percentage for being in the majority is very high; he
voted with the majority 89.2% of the time. His being in the major-
ity so often may also provide a neutral explanation for why White
authored so many opinions for the Court. But opportunities and
opinions do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. Chief Justice War-
ren Burger, for instance, had an even higher percentage for being
in the majority and wrote far fewer opinions. The Chief Justice
was in the majority in over 91.5% of the 140 environmental cases
in which he participated. Yet he wrote only eight opinions for the
Court.
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in
the majority, however, does not relate to either Chief Justice Bur-
ger or to Justice White. The Justice with the most astounding re-
cord for being in the majority is Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has
participated in fifty-seven cases to date. Other than an original
action of interstate water dispute, 15 he has dissented only once, in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.16 The Court, moreover, has since
overruled its eleventh amendment decision in Union Gas.17 So, in
effect, Justice Kennedy's record is virtually 100% (putting aside a
couple of somewhat qualified concurring opinions).' 8
But how many opinions for the Court has Justice Kennedy
written? One might expect as many as ten but certainly no fewer
than six. But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy
had written only two opinions for the Court. 19 He added two more
this past Term. 20 Kennedy supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth
vote in three out of those four cases.
15. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991).
16. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
17. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
18. During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which also joined Justice Scalia's
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), which joined only in the judgment.
19. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
20. The third and fourth cases were both decided after the formal presentation of
the Garrison Lecture this past March. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119
S. Ct. 1624 (1999); Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719
(1999).
624 [Vol. 19
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/7
2002] THIRTY YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This is a striking result. The most significant vote has little
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing. Justice Kennedy
is the key to the majority in environmental protection and natural
resources law cases today. Yet he almost never writes an opinion
for the Court on these issues.
The upshot is the exacerbation of the Court's longstanding
lack of environmental voice. Justice White, who wrote most of the
opinions, did not provide it. Justice Kennedy, who now appears to
reflect the controlling philosophy for the Court in these cases, has
similarly not yet expressed an overarching view of the environ-
mental law field. He has instead, like White during the 1970s and
1980s, simply joined opinions that, because they are the products
of shifting majority coalitions, lack any consistent or coherent
theme.
C. Justice Douglas vs. Justice Scalia: Scoring the Justices on
Environmental Protection
The last categorical inquiry concerns the voting patterns of
individual Justices based on the relationship of their votes to envi-
ronmental protection objectives. When do their votes promote en-
vironmental protection? And when do their votes appear to
undercut it?
Most Court observers' intuitions regarding the Justices would
likely be that those Justices who are considered "liberal" cast
votes in favor of environmental protection concerns, while those
more "conservative" members of the Court do not. To test that
hypothesis, I undertook two detailed analyses of the votes of the
Justices-one more qualitative and the other striving to be quan-
titative. Interestingly, the more qualitative analysis questions
the intuitive view, while the more quantitative approach restores
some of its force. Each is discussed next.
1. What is most immediately suggested by an admittedly un-
scientific, impressionistic review of the votes of individual Justices
in environmental cases is the wholly paradoxical nature of the vot-
ing patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protec-
tion perspective. 21 The votes of a few Justices in selected cases
are illustrative.
21. My conclusions in this single respect are strikingly similar to those drawn by
Professor Sive, based on his review in 1994 of the Supreme Court's environmental law
rulings in the October 1993 Term. Remarking upon the odd voting patterns of indi-
vidual Justices in those cases, Professor Sive characterized environmental cases as
making for "strange judicial bedfellows" that Term. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel,
625
7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the
environmental community for being unsympathetic to environ-
mental protection concerns. There are his votes against more ex-
pansive federal reserved water rights in national forests in United
States v. New Mexico;22 against enhanced procedural rights for en-
vironmentalists in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. ;23 against endangered species
protection in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill;24 and in favor of a
more aggressive regulatory takings test in both Penn Central v.
City of New York 25 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis.26
Labeling the Chief Justice as somehow "anti-environmental"
is problematic because many of his votes support environmental-
ist causes. He voted to uphold environmental criminal convictions
in United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.;27
supported the validity of stricter local noise controls in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal;28 concluded that federal in-
stallations must comply with state air pollution control require-
ments in Hancock v. Train29 and joined the dissenters in Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society30 in contending that
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was required to certify Japan for
failing to comply with International Whaling Convention whaling
quotas. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in a
series of Dormant Commerce Clause cases stress the importance
of the environmental protection goals as an affirmative reason for
upholding the challenged governmental action.31
Similar crisscrossing tendencies are evident in the votes of
Justice Stevens, who is generally considered sympathetic to envi-
ronmental protection concerns. Stevens' opinions, widely hailed
An Analysis of the Justices' Positions in Environmental Cases Demonstrates that Doc-
trinal Classifications Aren't Very Useful, NAT'L L.J., October 3, 1994, at B5.
22. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
23. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
24. 437 U.S. 153, 211 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27. 411 U.S. 655, 676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. 426 U.S. 167, 199 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting), Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
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by the environmental community, include his opinion for the
Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n,3 2 and his dissents in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,33 Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council,34 Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo,35 and Sec-
retary of the Interior v. California.36
But environmentalists do not similarly acclaim Stevens' dis-
sents in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock,37 favoring
preemption of state environmental regulation of mining activities
on federal land; in Penn Central, against the constitutionality of a
state historic landmark designation challenged as a regulatory
taking;38 and in Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago,39
rejecting the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that an exemp-
tion from a federal hazardous waste statute should be narrowly
read. Several of Stevens' votes against positions favored by envi-
ronmentalists supplied the critical fifth vote for the majority's ad-
verse ruling, including United States v. New Mexico,40 Industrial
Union v. American Petroleum,41 and Japan Whaling Ass'n.42
For almost all of the Justices, a similar pattern is evident.
Whatever the particular Justice's reputation, significant counter-
examples are available. Whether it is Justice Brennan, authoring
the environmentalist's nightmare of a dissent in San Diego Gas
Electric v. City of San Diego,43 which subsequently became the
Court's holding in First English Evangelical Church v. County of
Los Angeles,44 or Justice O'Connor, dissenting in First English,45
and in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,46 in which she supported NRDC's more envi-
32. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
33. 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. 505 U.S. 1003, 1061 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. 456 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. 464 U.S. 312, 344 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. 480 U.S. 572, 594 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
39. 511 U.S. 328, 340 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
41. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
42. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
43. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
45. See id. at 322 (O'Connor, J., joining in part, Stevens & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
46. 470 U.S. 116, 165 (1985).
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ronmentally protective reading of the Clean Water Act, while
Justice Brennan did not.4 7
2. A more quantitative approach to the Justices' voting sug-
gests, however, some discernible patterns and tendencies in the
votes of the Justices in environmental cases. These tendencies
may or may not be sufficiently strong to suggest a correlation be-
tween the votes and overarching labels such as "conservative" or
"liberal." But, in either event, they strongly suggest that, at least
for some justices, the environmental dimension of the case is rele-
vant to how the Justice casts his or her vote in that case.
The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring system
somewhat reminiscent of that employed by the League of Conser-
vation Voters Test in scoring members of Congress on environ-
mental matters.48 Here, however, it is applied to the Justices. A
Justice is awarded one point for each pro-environmental protec-
tion outcome for which the Justice voted. The final score, referred
to as an "EP score," is based on the percentage of pro-environmen-
tal votes the Justice cast, out of those cases in which that Justice
participated. For the purposes of calculating this score, the entire
database of 243 cases is not used. The scores are instead based on
a subset of approximately 100 cases, representing those cases that
are more susceptible to being assigned a pro-environmental posi-
tion.49 An EP score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the envi-
ronmentally-protective outcome in all the cases in which she
participated. A score of zero means that the Justice voted for that
environmental outcome in none of the cases.
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmen-
tally-protective, the scores are both easy and not surprising in
their results.50 The highest score went to Justice Douglas, who
47. Justice Brennan joined Justice White's majority opinion, supplying the
needed fifth vote for EPA and against NRDC. See id. at 116.
48. See League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters National
Environmental Scorecard at http://www.lcv.org/scorecards/index.htm (last visited
May 28, 1999).
49. The cases upon which the EP Scores are based are those listed in italics in the
appendix.
50. The EP scores for the nineteen Justices who have served on the Court since
October Term 1969 are Chief Justice Burger (34.3), Justices Black (75), Blackmun
(50.3), Brennan (58.5), Breyer (66.6), Douglas (100), Ginsburg (63.6), Harlan (33.3),
Kennedy (25.9), Marshall (61.3), O'Connor (30.4), Powell (30), Chief Justice Rehnquist
(36.5), Scalia (13.8), Souter (57.1), Stevens (50.6), Stewart (42.6), Thomas (20), and
White (36.3). For a full description of the database upon which the EP analysis was
performed, see Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"About Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703 (2000).
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scored 100. Justice Douglas may well be the only environmental
Justice ever on the Court, at least in modem times. Notwith-
standing his high profile, Justice Douglas was, as a practical mat-
ter, barely there for modem environmental law. He was off the
Court by 1975, and plagued by serious health problems during his
final time on the Court. As a result, he voted in only fifteen of the
100 cases surveyed for the EP Score.
The highest EP scores for those Justices serving on the Court
for substantial time are those of Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall
(61.3) and Stevens (50.6).51 Each of their scores, however, is much
lower than Douglas' score. None of these other scores is suffi-
ciently high to suggest that the environmental protection dimen-
sion of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing
their respective votes.
The EP scoring analysis further identifies more Justices with
potentially revealing EP scores on the low end, suggesting some
possible skepticism, or perhaps even hostility, towards environ-
mental protection concerns or the kind of legal regime such con-
cerns promote. There are many EP scores below thirty-three, a
number below thirty, and two below twenty-five. As with the high
EP scores, there is a hands-down winner, though no score of zero
to equal Justice Douglas' score of 100. And, as with Justice Doug-
las, there are no surprises at the lowest of the low end.
The low score goes to Justice Scalia with a score just below
fourteen, which is strikingly low. It is a score so low that one can
fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives environmental protection
concerns as promoting a set of legal rules antithetical to that
which he favors. Indeed, the kind of legal system promoted by en-
vironmental law seems to be of sufficient concern that it even
prompts Justice Scalia sometimes to abandon his views on core
matters involving constitutional and statutory interpretation.5 2
51. Although the cases upon which the EP scores are based appear in the appen-
dix, infra, the full related database, including the voting breakdown in each of those
cases, the case topic, the identity of the legal position in each case that received a
point, and the final EP scores of each of the Justices, is not separately published here
because of its substantial length. It instead appears in Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring
What's "Environmental"About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 703 (2000).
52. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992), embracing an interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment based on "our constitutional culture," and his dissenting opinion in Public Util-
ity District No. 1 v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 724 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), reaching for a construction of the Clean Water Act favored by
industry, are illustrative. See 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While I agree
629
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What about Kennedy, the Court's current bellwether Justice
who has been in the majority in virtually every environmental
case before the Court since he joined the bench? His score is just
below twenty-six, which is the third lowest out of nineteen Jus-
tices over the past thirty years. Although Justice Kennedy's score
may well mask some significant potential for a future shift,5 3 it
should be unsettling for environmentalists to learn that a score of
twenty-six represents the Court's current point of equilibrium.
3. Finally, viewed over time, the EP scores of the Justices in-
dicate that the Court as a whole is steadily becoming less respon-
sive to environmental protection. Indeed, the overall shift in the
fate of environmental protection before the Court during the past
three decades is telling.54 In 1975, there were no Justices sitting
on the Court with scores below thirty. Today, there are three with
scores of thirty or below (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) and two
with scores of twenty or below (Scalia and Thomas).55
II. The Supreme Court's Apathy and Possible Antipathy
Towards Environmental Protection: Lessons for the
Current and Future Environmental Lawyer
The overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking
to the Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environ-
mental protection. Environmental protection concerns implicated
fully with the thorough analysis in the Court's opinion, I add this comment for em-
phasis. For judges who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern
the intent of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case.").
53. Although Justice Kennedy's writing in the area remains sparse, he filed con-
curring opinions in three cases in which he expressed views that create at least the
theoretical possibility of his breaking away from Justice Scalia's approach. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Richard
Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVr'L FORUM 8 (May/June 1999).
54. These comparisons are based on the Justices' EP scores for their entire ca-
reers and not their EP scores as of the precise date to which the text refers. A refer-
ence to the EP scores of the Justices in 1975, therefore, considers the career EP scores
of all the Justices who were serving on the Court in 1975, which will include their
votes before and after 1975. The 1975 date simply determines the identity of the
relevant Justices and does not confine the database with regard to precedent for pur-
poses of calculating EP scores.
55. One must be careful, however, about too quickly equating the votes of individ-
ual Justices with Court rulings. The two do not necessarily correlate. For instance,
forty environmentally favorable votes could reflect five unanimous rulings or nine
five/four rulings. For that same reason, thirty environmentally favorable votes could
reflect six favorable Court rulings and, therefore, more than forty environmentally
favorable votes.
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by a case appear, at best, to play no favored role in shaping the
outcome. But nor does the outcome seem wholly neutral or indif-
ferent to the presence of those concerns.
Over the past three decades, environmental protection con-
cerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influenc-
ing the Court's outcome. The preferred outcome is one that places
less, rather than more, weight on the need to promote environ-
mental protection. The Court's decisions, and the attitudes of the
individual Justices, reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy of
environmental protection goals and the various laws that seek
their promotion. This analysis leads to two significant conclusions
worth further analysis.
The first conclusion relates to the relative absence of any no-
tion, for most of the Justices during the past three decades, that
environmental law is a distinct area of law, as opposed to just a
collection of legal issues incidentally arising in a factual setting
where environmental protection concerns are what is at stake.
The Court's opinions lack any distinct environmental voice. Miss-
ing is any emphasis on the nature or character of environmental
protection concerns and their import for judicial construction of
relevant legal rules. The Court's decisions in TVA v. Hill,56 City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,57 and Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 8 all represent
significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental concerns in the
Supreme Court. In none of those rulings, however, do those con-
cerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in the Court's analysis.
Imagine, however, if Justice Douglas were on the Court and
writing any of the Court's opinions in those three cases. The
Court's rhetoric regarding environmental protection and its legal
relevance would be far different. Recall his genuine passion in
dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton,59 in favor of expansive no-
tions of legal standing on behalf of "inarticulate members of the
ecological group" (e.g. animals) where he argued in favor of legal
doctrine providing a voice in court "all of the forms of life ... the
pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings
as well as the trout in the streams."60 Or consider Justice Black's
emotional dissent in San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas
56. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
57. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
58. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
59. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 752.
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Highway Commission,61 in which he decried cars "spew[ing] forth
air and noise pollution,"62 he warned of mothers "grow[ing] anx-
ious... lest their children be crushed beneath the massive wheels
of interstate trucks,"63 and he described environmental laws as
safeguarding "our Nation's well-being and our very survival."64
Such emotion has meaning when it comes from the Supreme
Court.
For most of the Court, most of the time, environmental law
has become no more than a subspecies of administrative law, rais-
ing no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a
substantive area of law. Environmental protection is merely an
incidental context for resolution of a legal question. Recall again
Justice White's decision to side with EPA in Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n v. NRDC,65 upholding the validity of variances for
technology-based standards otherwise applicable to discharges of
toxic effluent. He stressed in his note to Justice Marshall that
resolution of the case did not make much of a difference to admin-
istrative law one way or the other.66
What are the practical implications of the Court's approach to
environmental law for someone wanting to be an environmental
lawyer, or a lawyer concerned about environmental protection?
First, to be an outstanding environmental lawyer requires your
being an excellent lawyer. That means a law student zealously
pursuing a career in environmental law should not just concen-
trate on taking "environmental law" classes. Master the "wilder-
ness" of administrative law.67 Delve into the complexities of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction-likely the most important
course many environmental public interest litigators take in law
school. Similarly, approach courses in corporations, tax, securi-
ties, and real estate law. More often than not, the fate of the envi-
ronmental interests will turn on the resolution of legal issues
rooted deeply in these other areas of law.
Likewise, as legal counsel, do not approach cases with envi-
ronmental blinders on. Be ready to see and understand the case
or controversy in its broader legal context. And be ready to
61. 400 U.S. 968 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 969.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 971.
65. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
66. See supra note 14, and accompanying text.
67. See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
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master that broader legal context. Do not just read environmental
cases. An environmental lawyer is likely to find the most impor-
tant, most relevant precedent elsewhere, precisely because it is
elsewhere. 68
Indeed, because of environmental protection's apparent disfa-
vored status, the precedent most supportive of an environmen-
tally-protective outcome frequently can be found in cases where
the favorable implications for environmental protection concerns
are not at all immediately obvious. The challenge of the environ-
mental lawyer is to discover and exploit (and, when necessary, dis-
tinguish) that potentially relevant precedent. It may be in
nonenvironmental standing cases such as the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 69 which
supports broadened standing in environmental cases involving in-
formation reporting requirements; 70 or nonenvironmental regula-
tory takings cases such as Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 71 in which
Justice Kennedy advances a more restricted approach to regula-
tory takings doctrine that could aid environmental regulators
faced with such constitutional challenges. 72
The second closely related lesson for the environmental law-
yer is the importance of being strategic in framing and presenting
environmental cases in litigation. An environmental lawyer, espe-
cially one representing interests that support enhanced environ-
mental protection measures, should not mistake her motivation
and interest in the case for what is likely to prompt a favorable
outcome in an administrative or judicial setting. The environmen-
tal lawyer must be open to the possibility that it may not be in her
client's strategic interest to emphasize the environmental protec-
tion dimensions of the case at all.
68. For example, the Supreme Court's ruling this past Term in Saenz v. Roe, 119
S. Ct. 1518 (1999), resurrecting the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege and Immuni-
ties Clause to strike down California's cap on welfare payments for new residents,
may well trigger a new wave of constitutional challenges brought by property owners
against environmental regulators based on that same Clause. See Carrie Johnson,
The Road to Saenz v. Roe, 22 THE LEGAL TiMEs 1, May 24, 1999; Clint Bolick, Back
from the Grave-The Supreme Court Exhumes the 14th Amendment's 'Privileges or
Immunities' Clause, 22 THE LEGAL TIMES 19, May 17, 1999.
69. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
70. See Cass Sunstein, Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Be-
yond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613-15, 621-24, 651-52, 663-69 (1999)
71. 524 U.S. 498, 539-47 (1998).
72. See 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Richard Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L FORUM 8 (May/
June 1999).
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An advocate needs, of course, to focus the decisionmaker on
her best legal or policy arguments. Those that the advocate cares
about, however, may not be those likely to motivate the deci-
sionmaker towards the preferred outcome. Like any good lawyer,
the environmental lawyer needs to identify and address the deci-
sionmaker's concerns, and not make the mistake of assuming that
she shares the advocate's own.
The current Court is, at the very least, not a Court comprised
of Justices looking at cases as "environmental law" cases. Other
crosscutting issues are more likely to influence their votes rather
than the environmental protection implications of one result over
another. What the Justices believe, for instance, should be the
relationship between courts and administrative agencies regard-
ing matters of statutory construction, or, the relationship between
states and the federal government in their respective areas of law-
making. The Justices strive for consistency on these crosscutting
issues that apply in a variety of contexts, of which environmental
law seems to be just one of many.
Different cases therefore require different strategies. For
Justice Scalia, it may well be to turn the case into a plain meaning
case, or a nonlegislative history case.73 Indeed, for Scalia, there
may well be reason not to emphasize the positive environmental
protection implications of the side that you are promoting. For the
Chief Justice, it may well be to emphasize judicial integrity con-
cerns, including the autonomy of trial courts, the costs of frag-
mented litigation, premature judicial decision making, and
possible burdens on the federal judiciary.74 For Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, it may well be the federalism implications of a par-
ticular outcome, stare decisis, concerns with judicial activism, and
the sheer inequities of a particular result.
73. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994);
Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 15-19 (1995).
74. The Chief Justice's concerns with preserving state sovereignty in the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause cases is one obvious example. See notes 23 to 32, supra, and
accompanying text. Similar concerns seem to temper Rehnquist's views on the regu-
latory takings issue. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Hold-
ings in the Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099,
1111-14 (1996); Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Re: Agins v. City of Tiburon (May 29, 1980) (Official Papers of the Chambers of
Justice Thurgood Marshall) ("I am somewhat uneasy about the latitude which your
treatment of federal constitutional review of local zoning ordinances on pages 5 and 6
of your present draft appears to give federal courts."). Id.
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The more fundamental issue is whether, regardless of the
strategic advantages of thinking outside the "environmental" box
in environmental litigation, such a stripping of the "environment"
out of environmental law is a positive or appropriate development
for environmental law. My short answer is the law professor's
classic "yes and no." Some stripping is appropriate, but not to the
extent that has occurred in the Supreme Court.
Why is it partially appropriate? Simply because the Justices'
natural instinct about environmental law is partially correct: En-
vironmental law does not exist in a vacuum. Environmental law
issues do arise in contexts that implicate other, very important
crosscutting areas of law, such as administrative law, corporate
law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth Amendment law, and criminal
law.
Nor is it happenstance that environmental law constantly
arises in these other contexts. So many different kinds of activi-
ties implicate environmental protection concerns that the legal re-
quirements serving that end must necessarily be widely
applicable. Those legal requirements also necessarily create fric-
tion by restriking balances previously reached by other pre-ex-
isting legal rules governing that same activity. By promoting
rapid change in the law in response to increased public demands
for environmental protection, environmental law necessarily
places great pressure on lawmaking institutions and generates
conflicts between competing lawmaking fora, between sovereign
authorities (local, state, tribal and federal) and within their re-
spective executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
The Justices' focus in the first instance on these crosscutting
issues is also quite proper. The Justices should strive for consis-
tency in their resolution. There should not always be one answer
if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not.
Such singularly outcome-dependent judicial reasoning could seri-
ously undermine the law's essential integrity and legitimacy.
But that is not to say that environmental protection concerns
are irrelevant when addressing those crosscutting issues. Such
concerns legitimately inform the judicial resolution of those issues
and sometimes justify striking a new and different balance. Envi-
ronmental protection concerns need not always be a dispositive
factor to be legitimately so in some instances, and always to re-
main a relevant factor for separate consideration.
In the early 1970s, the Court appeared to understand the
broader implications of the nation's commitment to a legal regime
635
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for environmental protection. The Court seemed to recognize its
responsibility to account for the corresponding evolutionary pres-
sures being triggered by that emerging legal regime on other in-
tersecting areas of law and on lawmaking institutions. Since
then, the Court has too often mistakenly equated the judiciary's
involvement with such traditional, legitimate legal evolution with
the 1980s judicial bugaboo of "judicial activism."
The cost of this mistaken belief is substantial. The Court de-
prives itself of its ability to consider the sheer importance of envi-
ronmental protection to the issues before the Court. Even more
fundamentally, the Court fails to consider how the special chal-
lenges that environmental protection presents may warrant
evolution in legal doctrine. 75
The Court's treatment of the issue of standing during the past
three decades is emblematic of its attitude towards environmental
law. The Court originally relaxed standing requirements in re-
sponse to the special challenges presented by environmental
law.7 6 The Court revised the standing doctrine in recognition of
the nature of the injuries at stake in environmental litigation be-
ing neither clearly economic nor physical.7 7 The Court likewise
took special account of the inevitable, uncertain and speculative
nature of such injuries, in particular, the more attenuated chain of
causation between action and injury.78
In recent years the Court has handed down a series of stand-
ing rulings that fails to consider these challenges and, as a result,
makes it especially difficult for plaintiff citizens to maintain envi-
75. To be sure, one can perceive snippets of environmental law's influence in rare,
isolated opinions of the Justices. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas was most apt to
see the relationship. For instance, in two cases in 1972, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water, 410 U.S. 719 (1972) and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Wa-
tershed Improvement, 410 U.S. 743 (1972), the Court ruled that equal protection was
not violated by a state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only landowners
to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their votes according
to the value of the land each owned. Justice Douglas perceived the cases differently
than the majority precisely because he understood the role that water played in the
lives and ecosystem of the affected tenants. See 410 U.S. at 749 ("It is also inconceiv-
able that a body with the power to destroy a river by damming it and so deprive a
watershed of one of its most salient environmental assets does not have 'sufficient
impact' on the interests of people generally to invoke the principles of [this Court's
voting rights precedent]"). Id.
76. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REV. 631,
658-64 (1986).
77. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
78. See United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973).
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ronmental lawsuits. The trend has been so plain that it even
prompted Justice Blackmun to question openly in dissent why the
Court systematically disfavored environmental plaintiffs in the
law of standing.79
Another area is the law of regulatory takings. Here too, the
Court's early case law suggested an appreciation for how environ-
mental protection and natural resource conservation concerns
might justify a rethinking of the nature of private property rights
in natural resources.80 But, the Court has since seemed more at-
tracted to a view of property that is static, not dynamic, and there-
fore restricts the legislature's constitutional authority to promote
environmental protection. 8'
Standing law and regulatory takings law are just two of the
more obvious examples. The Court's need to consider the lessons
supplied by environmental law in addressing crosscutting issues
extends to less obvious areas as well, such as corporate law. Dur-
ing the October 1997 Term, for instance, in United States v.
Bestfoods, 2 the Court faced the question under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),83 of the liability of a parent corporation for the actions
of a subsidiary. What was striking about the oral argument
before the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and
sympathetic to the important policy objectives underlying corpo-
rate law's limited liability rules, but were not similarly aware of
environmental law's competing concerns. Indeed, members of the
Court appeared shocked to learn from both government and in-
dustry counsel, the undisputed common ground regarding con-
gressional intent in CERCLA in terms of corporate liability.8 4
79. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.") Id. After the presentation of this Gar-
rison Lecture and immediately before this article went to final press, the Supreme
Court took an anticipated, yet important, step toward reversing this trend in a ruling
noted later in this article. See infra, note 108.
80. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Penn Central
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1980).
81. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
82. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1999).
84. Official Transcript of the Oral Argument before the United States Supreme
Court, United States u. Bestfoods, No. 97-454, pp. 16-17, 1998 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 61
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III. Bringing the "Environment" Back to Environmental
Law: Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services
The important remaining question is whether existing trends
in the Court's approach to environmental law can be changed.
Past experience strongly suggests that the answer to that ques-
tion may well depend on both the life experiences (professional
and personal) that the current and future Justices bring with
them to their work. It is no coincidence that the only Justice with
a significantly high EP Score (100) is Justice Douglas, whose
deeply-held views favoring environmental protection restrictions
find their roots in his life-long involvement with the natural envi-
ronment as an avid hiker and outdoorsman.85 No current Justice
has comparable links to the natural environment in general or to
either resource conservation or environmental protection matters
more particularly.8 6
Perhaps the short answer to the question of how best to re-
store the "environment" to environmental law in the Court might
be to find some way to provide individual Justices with personal
experiences that allow them to appreciate more fully the environ-
mental stakes of the cases before the Court. But putting aside
such extra-judicial influences, the most viable basis for persuad-
ing the Justices of the need for placing greater weight on the envi-
ronmental dimension of environmental law is going to be through
the facts of the individual cases brought to the Court's attention.
Each of those cases presents the Justices with a story about the
way in which laws affect the quality of life. The cumulative effect
of multiple stories can significantly affect the way the Justices de-
cide what cases to hear and how then to decide the legal issues
presented.
To the detriment of environmental protection concerns, the
property rights movement has used this technique with enormous
success. By bringing to the Court's attention during the past sev-
eral decades a series of cases, the factual allegations of which ap-
pear to support their claim of environmental regulatory over-
(March 24, 1998) (argument of Ms. Schiffer, counsel for the United States EPA); id. at
26-27 (argument of Mr. Geller, counsel for Bestfoods).
85. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN, 203-36 (Delta Pub. 1974).
86. The only current Justice with such possible strong personal ties to the natural
environment might be Justice David Souter, based on his reputation as a hiker. See
David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice: Ascetic at Home But Vigorous on Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1990, at A1:3.
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reaching, such as claims of economic wipe-outs,8 7 or wheelchair-
bound, blind widows being denied the right to build a dream
home,88 these advocates have successfully fostered a general judi-
cial skepticism about the reasonableness of environmental laws.
It is, of course, that same judicial skepticism that environ-
mentalists and environmental regulators must now overcome.
Environmentalists and environmental regulators face a conun-
drum. As previously described, it is likely often not in their short
term strategic interests to emphasize the environmental dimen-
sion of a case because of the Court's current skepticism. But, un-
less environmentalists begin to tell their own story to the Justices,
they are unlikely to dispel that skepticism in the longer term. A
simultaneous accomplishment of those two often conflicting objec-
tives will not be easy. It will require careful case management
and case selection to bring to the Justices' attention cases that
both instruct the Court on the important policies and values safe-
guarded by environmental protection laws and explain how such
safeguarding is entirely consistent with our nation's legal
traditions.
There is currently at least some reason for optimism that the
Court may be about to take an initial step in the right direction.
The Court has agreed to review this October 1999 Term a poten-
tially very important environmental case, Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services.8 9 The Fourth Circuit's ruling
under review in Laidlaw90 was an absolutely disastrous decision
for environmentalists. But what made the lower court ruling so
significant was that it was not so much the product of a mere aber-
rational court of appeals decision than it was suggestive of the ju-
risprudential signals that the Supreme Court has been sending
out to the lower courts about the strict application of Article III
case or controversy requirements to environmental citizen suits.
For that same reason, however, the case provided the Court with
the opportunity both to embrace the important role Congress in-
tended for citizen suits to serve in environmental law and to strike
a balance in constitutional Article III doctrine that is more accom-
modating to that congressional scheme.
87. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992).
88. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); see Richard
J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United
States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997).
89. 525 U.S. 1176 (1999).
90. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 149 F.3d 303 (4th
Cir. 1998).
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In Laidlaw, the plaintiff, Friends of the Earth, brought a
fairly routine citizen suit against an industrial facility owned by
Laidlaw Environmental Services based on hundreds of violations
of Laidlaw's Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System permit, both by exceeding allowable mercury dis-
charges and by violating monitoring and reporting require-
ments.91 No Gwaltney92 threshold jurisdictional problem was
presented; no one disputed that the facility was in noncompliance
both at the time the sixty day-notice and the subsequent lawsuit
was filed. The trial took several years, however, and by the time
the trial was complete, the company was no longer in noncompli-
ance. The district court, accordingly, declined any request for in-
junctive relief, but imposed more than $400,000 in civil penalties,
payable to the U.S. Treasury, and expressly indicated that an at-
torney's fee award would similarly be forthcoming. 93
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed.94 The ap-
pellate court held that once the facility came into compliance, the
case became moot.95 No Article III jurisdiction existed, the court
ruled, for either a civil penalties award or for an attorney's fee
award. 96 The court, accordingly, ordered dismissal of the action in
its entirety, an absolutely dramatic result. Consider the perverse
incentive the appellate court's reasoning provides a regulated fa-
cility. So long as the facility comes into compliance prior to final
judgment in a citizen suit enforcement action, a facility that has
long been in violation of the federal environmental law, both
before and after the filing of the complaint, cannot be subject to
either a civil penalty or an attorney's fee award. The incentive to
comply prior to suit is dramatically reduced. Also sharply re-
duced, if not wholly eliminated, is the longstanding incentive that
defendants in environmental citizen suits have historically had to
settle their cases. Such settlements have led to defendants' pay-
91. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-01, 610 (D. S.C.
1997).
92. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49
(1987), the Court held that Clean Water Act citizen suits could not be maintained for
wholly past violations of that Act. See id. at 56-63. A plaintiff need, at a minimum,
set forth in the complaint good faith allegations of violations ongoing at the time that
the complaint is filed. See id. at 64-65.
93. See 956 F. Supp. at 610-11.
94. See 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
95. See id. at 307.
96. See id. at 306-07. The court's attorney's fee decision was especially remarka-
ble given that the court accompanied its ruling with a "but see" cite to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney. See id. at 307.
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ing hundreds of millions of dollars to support environmentally
beneficial projects. 97
From a purely historical perspective, the Court's granting cer-
tiorari in Friends of the Earth was, standing alone, of surprising
significance. The Court has heard almost 250 environmental
cases on the merits during the past thirty years, yet this was only
the second time that the Court granted a citizen suit petition in an
environmental case at the sole request of the citizen plaintiffs. To
be sure, the Justices have frequently done so at the behest of in-
dustry.98 Likewise, they have often granted review at the request
of federal, state and local governments. 99 But it has been twenty-
seven years since the Court last granted review at the exclusive
request of environmental plaintiffs, and that was in Sierra Club v.
Morton 00 in 1972.
There is also good reason to believe that the Court granted
review in Friends of the Earth to rule in favor of the environmen-
tal plaintiffs. It takes four votes to grant review and it is unlikely
that the four votes this time came from Justices seeking to affirm
the Fourth Circuit's analysis. A Justice seeking to make it harder
for environmental plaintiffs to bring suits would not pick this
case. This is a case presenting a record in which the trial court
97. See Jeff Ganguly, Comment, Environmental Remediation Through Supple-
mental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community In-
volvement in Federal Enforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 189 (1998); Laurie
Droughton, Comment, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargain for the Envi-
ronment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789 (1995).
98. Two recent examples include The Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environ-
ment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), but there are
many during the past three decades. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983);
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Ac-
tion, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49 (1988).
99. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981); Watt v. Energy Action Education Foundation, 454 U.S. 151
(1982); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S.
139 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The closest exception is provided
by Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). But, in Hallstrom, the Court
granted certiorari (489 U.S. 1077 (1989)) only after asking the Solicitor General of the
United States about the advisability of granting review (see 488 U.S. 811 (1989)) and
then only after the United States filed a brief both advising the Court to hear the case
on the merits and to rule against the environmental petitioners (see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, No. 88-42 (filed
February 17, 1989)), which the Court then did.
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found hundreds of violations occurring over many years. 10 1 The
violations, moreover, involve discharges of mercury; not sub-
stances seemingly innocuous to a layperson or to a lay Justice.
Mercury is a highly toxic subsistence that persists, rather than
degrades, in the natural environment.' 0 2 The record further
shows that the district court imposed a hefty fine of several hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, after finding that the company had
enjoyed an economic benefit of over one million dollars because of
those violations.' 0 3
A Justice seeking to erect mootness or other Article III barri-
ers to citizen suit enforcement would look for a case with a very
different record. Far preferable would be a case involving more
seemingly innocuous pollutants, 0 4 in order to both bolster possi-
ble suggestions of the frivolousness of the lawsuit and the lack of
necessity for citizen suit enforcement overall. Finally, no clear cir-
cuit conflict was presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari
because the Fourth Circuit relied upon a recent Supreme Court
ruling, The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, not yet
considered in this identical context by other circuits.
Of course, four votes do not a majority make. The necessary
five-vote majority for the environmental plaintiffs in Friends of
the Earth seems clearly in reach, however, in light of the Justices'
past voting record. In particular, at least two Justices, Kennedy
and O'Connor, seem quite open to the environmental plaintiffs
contention that the lower court misapplied mootness doctrine. Ar-
ticle III jurisdictional requirements is an area where both Justices
have written and/or joined separate opinions that reflect greater
awareness of the need for legal doctrine to evolve in response to
the special concerns raised by the demands of environmental pro-
tection. Justice O'Connor actually dissented in Lujan v. Defenders
101. See 956 F. Supp. at 600-01.
102. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION-LAw, Sci-
ENCE, & POLICY 475 (1996).
103. See id. at 610-11, 613.
104. For example, some in the environmental community strongly urged the envi-
ronmental plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997) not to seek Supreme Court review. Al-
though environmentalists were unanimously of the view that the Third Circuit's rul-
ing on standing in Magnesium Elektron was very harmful, legally erroneous, and
could form the basis of a strong petition for a writ of certiorari, there was far less
agreement on the essential strategic inquiry whether the case presented the facts
needed to make that legal argument in the strongest possible light. A substantial
proportion of the alleged violations of the Clean Water Act at issue involved dis-
charges of salt and heat. See id. at 115.
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of Wildlife, and joined Blackmun's opinion, which denounced the
majority for its "slash and burn" of the law of environmental
standing.'0 5 Kennedy, the current bellwether Justice for deter-
mining the majority ruling,10 6 joined most of the majority opinion
in that same case, but he also wrote separately to stress, along
with Justice Souter, how environmental protection concerns
might justify Congress' allowance of less concrete injuries and
more attenuated chains of causation without offending Article III
of the Constitution. 0 7
Were both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to fashion a ma-
jority with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg on the
issues before the Court in Friends of the Earth, the resulting opin-
ion could begin to restore what makes environmental law "envi-
ronmental." The Court could acknowledge that environmental
protection concerns warrant rethinking the way that Article III
standing and mootness requirements are understood and applied.
At the very least, the case represents an all-too-rare opportunity
for the Court to take a positive step in that direction.' 08
105. 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 16 to 21 and accompanying text.
107. See 504 U.S. at 580 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. Subsequent events reveal that such a positive step has now been taken. The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Friends of the Earth on March 1, 1999 (see
525 U.S. 1176 (1999)), which was a few days before the delivery of this Garrison Lec-
ture. The case was argued in October 1999, several months after the written manu-
script for publication was complete. On January 12, 2000, just as this article was
going to final press, the Court announced its decision in the case. See Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000). As anticipated,
the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's mootness ruling. See 120 S. Ct. 693, 697
(1999). The Court, moreover, also rejected Laidlaw's effort to defend the court of ap-
peals' judgment on the alternative ground that Friends of the Earth lacked Article III
standing. See id. The Court rejected Laidlaw's contention that a citizen suit plaintiff
must demonstrate actual injury to the natural environment. The Court ruled that
injury to the environment is not the relevant inquiry for standing, which should in-
stead be whether the plaintiff has been injured. According to the Court, moreover,
Friends of the Earth had established such injury by establishing that their members'
reasonable concerns about the possible effects of the unlawful discharges had affected
adversely their willingness to use the waterway at issue. See id. at 698. The Court
further ruled that, because of their future deterrent effect, civil penalties could pro-
vide sufficient redress for citizen suit standing purposes even when the defendant was
currently in compliance and those penalties were payable exclusively to the federal
treasury. See id. The court's opinion departs significantly from some of the broader
implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environmental citi-
zen suit plaintiffs, discussed in this article's text. Justice Ginsburg authored the
Court's opinion, joined by six others, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
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IV. Conclusion
Bringing the "environment" back to "environmental law" is, of
course, a long and not a short term undertaking. Even a ruling in
a single case such as Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw is only that:
A single ruling in a single case. It is a far cry from a reversal of
the trend disfavoring environmental protection that is apparent in
the Court's decisions during the past three decades.
Nor will the longer term restoration, now warranted, occur as
a result ultimately of the efforts of environmental lawyers of my
generation, or the efforts of David Sive, Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, or
Ollie Houck. It will depend largely on the future efforts of today's
law students, such as those here at Pace and at other law schools,
who are about to embark on a career in environmental law.
Environmental lawyers of my generation found inspiration in
the work of those who came before us, including Lloyd Garrison.
All I can hope for is that today's law students include some who
will find the necessary inspiration in the work of those within my
own generation of environmental lawyers and scholars; that they
will be thoughtful, strategic advocates for environmental law's im-
portant goals, and that they will work towards environmental
law's restoration in our nation's highest court.
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